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THE RIGHT TO VOTE: IS THE AMENDMENT
GAME WORTH THE CANDLE?
HeatherK. Gerken*
The Constitution doesnt guarantee Americans the right to vote. That always comes
asasurprisetonon-lawyers. ButyouwilsearchtheConstitutioninvainforanysuch
guarantee, astheJusticesoftheSupremeCourtcheerilyremindedusinBush v.
Gore.1 WhattheConstitutioncontainsisaseriesofthou shalt nots. Thoushaltnot
denytherighttovoteonaccountofrace2 orsex.3 Thoushaltnotimposepolltaxes.4
Thoushaltnotpreventeighteen-year-oldsfrom voting.5
Its difficult to develop a robust case law when you only know what you cant
do. Forthisreason, severalacademicsandreformershaveproposedamendingthe
Constitutiontoincludearighttovote. Theyarguethataconstitutionalamendment
wouldproduceanynumberofprogressivegoodies, includinganendtopartisangerry-
mandering, strictpolicingofburdensplacedontherighttovote, andanexpansion
ofthefranchise.6
Countmeasskeptical. AstheDoubtingThomasinainthissymposium,7 I should
emphasizethatI wouldbedelightedifarobustrighttovotewerealreadyenshrined
intheConstitution. I wouldbejustasdelightedifI possessedamagicwandandcould
putonethere. Butinaworldwithouteitheratextualguaranteeorareadycacheof
magicwands, I havesubstantialdoubtsastowhethertheamendmentgameisworth
thecandle. Itisunlikelythatanamendmentwouldachievewhatreformershaveprom-
ised it will achieve. Indeed, even when one looses ones imagination on the broader
possibilitiesassociatedwithamendment, itishardtoimaginewecouldreapbenefits
* J. SkellyWrightProfessorofLawatYaleUniversity. I wouldliketothankthepartici-
pantsintheRethinkingD.C. RepresentationinCongressconferenceforhelpfulcomments.
ExcellentresearchassistancewasprovidedbyEmilyBarnet, DanielRauch, andMengJia
Yang. ThisargumentwasfirstofferedinashortpostinSlate. Someofwhatfollowsdraws
from thatpost.
1 See Bushv. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 104 (2000) (percuriam).
2 See U.S. CONST. amend. XV, §1.
3 See U.S. CONST. amend. XIX.
4 See U.S. CONST. amend. XXIV.
5 See U.S. CONST. amend. XXVI.
6 See infra notes 3135, 58 and accompanying text.
7 Thereis, however, aDoubtingThomas. See, e.g., RichardBriffault, Three Questions
for the Right to Vote Amendment, 23 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 27, 28 (2014). Its always
arelieftobeonthesamesideofanissueasRichardBriffault, asheisoneofthewisestand
mostsensiblemembersinourfield. Ourpaperswerewritenindependently, buttherearedeep
continuitiesinouranalyses.
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substantialenoughtooutweightheextraordinarycostsassociatedwithasuccessful
amendmentcampaign. Theorganizationalmuscleandresourcestopushforreform are
inshortsupply, anditwouldbebeterforthoselimitedresourcestofocusonreforms
thataremorediscretebuteasiertoachieve.
Part I explains why Im skeptical that a right to vote wil produce enough change
inthesystem tojustifythecostsinvolved, especialywhencomparedtothemorecon-
ventionalandlesscostlyalternativesforeffectingchange. Ifanamendmentenshrining
therighttovotelooksanythinglikeitscognatesintheConstitution, itwillbethinly
described, maddeninglyvague, andpushedforwardbyself-interestedpoliticians. At
the very least, its unlikely to persuade judges to mandate large-scale reform. Judges
areconservativecreatures, atleastintheBurkeansense.8 Theyaretypicalyloatheto
upendasystem basedonavaguetextualguarantee. Andavaguetextualguaranteeis
as good as its likely to get. Nor is it likely to mater if the amendment gives Congress
more room to maneuver given that bodys unwillingness to do much with the power
italreadypossesses.
Part II attempts to break out of a cautious law professor mold and find scope
for imagination, to quote Anne Shirley.9 Ifwelookpastthetraditionalrationalesfor
amendment, onecanimagineatleasttwootherbenefitsthatmightcomefrom anef-
forttoamend. Thefirstisthatarobustsocialmovementmightalterthewaythatall
Americans, including judges, think about the right to vote. If thats the case, things
will change for the better, and it wont much matter what the text of the amendment
saysit might not even mater if the text of the Constitution is altered in the end. The
secondisthepossibilitythatamendingtheConstitutionmighthelplendsomecoher-
encetojudicialdoctrineintheelectionsarenabyprovidingjudgestoolstheysorely
lackinelectionlaw. Thefirstoffersasubstantialpayoffbutdependsonsteepodds;
thesecondseemslikelytofollow from amendmentbutrepresentsamodestbenefit
whenweighedagainstthecostsoftheamendingprocess.
I. PROMISES, PROMISES, PROMISES
A. The Costs of the Amendment Process
Before describing the benefits of constitutional amendment, its worth briefly
makingapedanticpoint. AmendingtheConstitutionisaheavylift. Evensetingaside
thechalengesinvolvedingetingCongresstodoanything, letalonegetingtherequi-
sitetwo-thirdsvotetoinitiatetheamendmentprocess, thereisthepeskychallenge
involvedingettingthree-quartersofthestatestoratifyit.10
8 ForanexplorationoftherelationshipbetweenBurkeandjudging, seeErnestA. Young,
RediscoveringConservatism:Burkean Political Theory and Constitutional Interpretation,
72 N.C. L. REV. 619, 64286 (1994).
9 L. M. MONTGOMERY, ANNE OF GREEN GABLES 3233 (Courage Books 1993) (1908).
10 U.S. CONST. art. V.
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Thattasklooksevenmoredauntingwhenoneacknowledgeswhy reformersare
seekinganamendment. Foryearsreformershavetriedtopasselectionreform through
statelegislaturesandCongress, encounteringoneroadblockafteranother. Theseare,
ofcourse, thesamestatelegislaturesandthesameCongressthatmustagreetoamend
theConstitution. Thismightleadyoutothinkthattalkofamendmentismerelyempty
rhetoric. Theusualreactiontoroadblocks, afteral, isnottoatemptamoonshot. But
reformers have a much more serious plan. They thinkcorrectly, I suspectthat the
righttovoteiseasiertoorganizearoundthanpiecemealreform andhopethatlarge-
scaleorganizingwilcausetheusualroadblockstofall.11 Nonetheless, thebasicpoint
stilstands. StatelegislaturesandCongressareformidablebarrierstoreform nomater
whatthescale.
Everyoneknowsthis, ofcourse, mostespecialyreformers. Butwealhaveabad
tendency to ignore what I have described elsewhere as the here to there problem.12
Theres a good deal of agreement about whats wrong with our election systemthe
hereand weve got lots of ideas about to how to fix itthe there. But academics,
atleast, haveabadhabitofannouncingtheirsolutionsasifwecouldjustaddwater
andproducethem. Whenevaluatingthecostsandbenefitsofagivenreform proposal,
its all too easy to think only of the costs associated with implementation, not those
associatedwithpassage. Ifwearegoingtoevaluatewhethertheamendmentgame
isworththecandle, however, wemustthinkabouttheresourcesinvolvedingetting
theamendmentpassedinthefirstplaceand assesswhetherthoseresourcesmightbe
betterdirectedelsewhere.
When one focuses on the here to there question, its hard to see why we should
putourmusclebehindamendingtheConstitution. Ifthebenefitsassociatedwith
amendment were substantial, perhaps Id think differently. But they are not. As I ex-
plain in the next section, an amendment isnt likely to get us much more than were
alreadygettingfrom thecourtsandCongress.
B. The Benefits of Amendment
Toseewhythebenefitsofamendingarenotassubstantialasmanythink, keep
inmindthatthereare, infact, twostagestotheamendmentprocess. Stage1 involves
passingit. Stage2 involvesmakinggoodonitspromise, eitherbyenforcingitsguar-
anteesthroughthecourtsorbyproddingCongresstousewhateverenforcementpower
its been given to pass legislation.13 GiventherealitiesassociatedwithStage1, my
11 Foronesuchassessment, seeADVANCEMENT PROJECT, IN PURSUIT OF AN AFFIRMATIVE
RIGHT TO VOTE: STRATEGIC REPORT JULY 2008 78 (2008), available at http://b.3cdn.net
/advancement/ae94ee5ad8686f5760_27m6vr0j7.pdf.
12 HEATHER K.GERKEN,THEDEMOCRACY INDEX:WHYOUR ELECTION SYSTEM IS FAILING
AND HOW TO FIX IT 68 (2010) [hereinafter GERKEN, DEMOCRACY INDEX].
13 Cf. JoshuaField, Creatinga Federal Right to Vote, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS 5 (June25,
2013), available at htp:/www.americanprogress.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/06/FieldVoting
Rights.pdf (acknowledging that even if a constitutional amendment were to pass, it would
not be an instant fix because reformers wouldhavetoenforcetherightthroughlitigation).
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assumptionisthattherighttovotewillbethinlydescribed, whichmeansthatalmost
everybenefitassociatedwiththeamendmentwillstill havetocomefrom thecourts
orCongressinStage2. Eveniftheseinstitutionswerenewlyempoweredornewly
chastenedbythepassageofanamendment, neitherislikelytobeforthcomingon
thisfront.
In order to unpack this argument, think about how Stage 1the amending
processis likely to unfold. The right to vote has generic support among Americans,
but thats plainly not enough to guarantee passage. If shalow popular support were all
weneeded, wewouldhavehadanamendmentalongtimeago. Buttheamendment
processrequiresreformerstomovefrom pollingtothepolls. Andthatmove, inturn,
requiresorganizationalmuscle, financialsupport, andbootsontheground.
Themomentonethinksabouthowmuchorganizingandpolitickingwilbeneces-
sarytopasstherighttovoteisthemomentonewonderswhatrolepoliticaleliteswill
playintheprocess. Thereasonweneedarighttovoteinthefirstplace, ofcourse,
isbecausethefoxesareguardingthehenhouse. Thepeoplewhoknow themostabout
reform andcarethemostaboutreform arethepoliticalincumbentswhomostlyoppose
reform. Reform generallygetspassed, then, whenitisintheinterestofonepartyor
another, which often means that the resulting package isnt entitled to the honorific
reform in the first place. Indeed, its precisely because reformers cant persuade
politicianstodotherightthingthattheyareturningtotheamendmentprocess.
Perhapsarobustgrassrootsmovementwillemergeandthepeoplewillhold
elected officials feet to the fire until the amendment process moves forward, though
I doubtitforreasonsdiscussedbelow.14 Buttheoddsarethattheamendmentprocess
willrequirethebackingofpoliticalelites, whoseskillatframingissuesandputting
them on the agenda has led one academic to call them conversational entrepreneurs
innationaldebates.15 Attheveryleast, theamendmentprocesswillrequirethevotes
ofpoliticalelites.
Sowhatwillpoliticiansvotefor? Theyaremostlikelytovoteforathinlyde-
scribed, upsettingly vague guarantee of the right to votethats presumably why
mostoftheconcreteproposalstakepreciselythisform.16 I assume, then, thataviable
amendmentwillincludetwothings. Thefirstisaguaranteeoftheright, enforceable
bythecourts. ThesecondisaclausegrantingCongressdiscretiontoenforcetheright
as wellthe equivalent of Section Five of the Fourteenth Amendment.
14 See discussioninfra PartII.
15 ROBERT W.BENNETT, TALKING IT THROUGH:PUZZLES OFAMERICAN DEMOCRACY 37,
168 n.6 (2003).
16 See, e.g., H.R.J. Res. 28, 108thCong. (2003), available at http://archive.fairvote.org
/?page=214;JaminB. Raskin, Whats Wrong with Bushv. Goreand Why We Need to Amend
the Constitution to Ensure it Never Happens Again, 61 MD.L.REV. 652, 694 (2002) [herein-
afterRaskin, Whats Wrong with Bushv. Gore];PressRelease, Rep. MarkPocan, Pocanand
EllisonAnnounceRighttoVoteAmendment(May13, 2013), available at http://pocan.house
.gov/media-center/press-releases/pocan-and-ellison-announce-right-to-vote-amendment.
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Iftheamendmenttakesthisform, thebenefitsreformersandacademicsassert
well reap are anything but automatic. Once a vague guarantee is embedded in the
Constitution(Stage1), reformerswillstill havetoturntolegislatorsandcourtstoget
something done (Stage 2). Thats why supportersofamendmentfaceanexcruciating
tacticaldilemmainpassingtheamendment. Thevaguerthetext, themorelikelyitis
topass, butthemoreworktherewillbetodopost-amendment. Makingthetextmore
concretemaymakeStage2 easier, butitwillcomplicateeffortstopasstheamend-
mentinthefirstplace. Afteral, ifitwereeasytoenfranchiseformerfelonsortoblock
voterID rulesortoguaranteeawell-administeredelectionsystem ortoendpartisan
gerrymandering, wewouldpresumablyhavedoneitalready.
Its possible, of course, that reformers could aim for something more than vague
language, eitherbywritingtheiraimsexplicitlyintothetextorcreatinganamendment
historysorobustthateveryoneunderstandswhattherightembodies. Onthisview,
reformerswouldbuildabigtentofsupportersbylinkingtheamendmenttolotsof
differentreforms.17
Theproblem withthisstrategyisthatitwillalsogenerateabigtentontheother
side. Push for felon enfranchisement, and youll run up against the tough-on-crime
lobby. TemptprogressiveswithabanonvoterID andlosethesupportofmany
Republicans. Promisetoendgerrymanderingandlosethesupportofmostincum-
bents. Thats why a vague textual guarantee is so tempting an option in Stage 1 even
ifitcreatesmoreworkforStage2.18
Assuming the right to vote takes the form I suggest, it wil open upor more pre-
cisely, expandtwo avenues for change: litigation and legislation. While proponents
arenotalwaysclearaboutwhethertheythinkthecourtsorCongresswilbeoursource
of solace, Ive grouped them in what I think are roughly the correct categories.
1. TheLitigationPath
Asnotedabove, becausethefoxesareguardingthehenhouse, weoftenlookto
thecourtstocurewhatailsourdemocracy.19 Butcourtshaveofferedafairlytepid
17 See, e.g., ADVANCEMENT PROJECT, supra note 11, at 7 (noting that pro-democracy
forces working on registration requirements and felon disenfranchisement could be united
and suggesting that civil rights groups seeking stronger protection from discriminatory
practices could join with other progressives who are seeking tamper-free voting machines);
JaminRaskin, Democratic Capital:A VotingRights Surge in Washington Could Strengthen
the Constitution for Everyone, 23 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 47, 5859 (2014) [hereinafter
Raskin, Democratic Capital](offeringasampleconstitutionalamendmentthathebelieveswil
extend the vote to D.C. and the territories, roll back the Supreme Courts campaign-finance
jurisprudence, andprotectminorparties). Briffault is skeptical about at least one of Raskins
claims. Briffault, supra note 7, at 38 (questioning whether Raskins proposed amendment
willaidminorparties).
18 RichardBriffaultraisesasimilarworry, thoughheframesitdifferently. See Briffault,
supra note7, at36, 41.
19 See supra PartI.B.
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response to reformers demands for change. With the exception of one person, one
vote, wheretheCourtfundamentallyalteredthepoliticallandscapewithitsrulings,
theCourthasdoneasmuchtoresistchangeastofacilitateit.
Anamendmentwouldchangeallofthat, wearetold, becauseitwouldforcethe
Courttotreattherighttovoteasfundamentalandthussubjecttostrictscrutiny.20
WeretheCourttoapplyarigorousform ofstrictscrutinytovotingcases, thedoc-
trinewouldshiftinimportantways. Reformerssuggest, forinstance, thatcourtswould
strikedownvoterID laws, invalidatelawsdisenfranchisingex-felons, rulethatthe
administrativeburdensonvotingconstitutedefactodisenfranchisement, andperhaps
evenstrikedownpartisangerrymanders.21
Thoseclaimsstrikemeaspainfullyoptimistic. TheCourthasrepeatedlytermed
the right to vote fundamental and insistedthatitisentitledtorigorousprotection.22
Even those cases that do not term the right fundamental laud its deep importance.23
ButtheCourthasnotsubjectedallburdensontherighttovotetoarigorousform of
strictscrutiny.24 AndeveniftheCourtfeltthatstrictscrutinyhadtobeappliedinevery
voting case in the wake of an amendment, strict scrutinys application would not be
fatalinfact. Tothecontrary, theCourtwouldhaveeverytemptationtobealmostas
passiveasitisnow. EithertheCourtwoulddeployaloosermeans/endsscrutinythan
itdeploysintheequalitycontextoritwouldtakeanexpansiveview ofwhatconsti-
tutesacompellingstateinterest.
Takethefirstcategoryofgoodiesthatprogressivesinsistwillresultfrom an
amendmentthose having to do with the administrative dimensions of voting, such
asvoterID andtheotherbureaucraticburdensplaced, deliberatelyorincidentally, on
therighttovote.25 Contrarytothesuggestionsofthosewhofavoramendment, the
20 See, e.g., ADVANCEMENT PROJECT, supra note 11, at 5, 1112.
21 See infra notes 3135 and accompanying text.
22 See, e.g., Ill. StateBd. ofElectionsv. SocialistWorkersParty, 440 U.S. 173, 184
(1979);Dunnv. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 342 (1972);Oregonv. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112, 112
(1970);Kramerv. UnionFreeSch. Dist. No. 15, 395 U.S. 621, 627 (1969);Harperv. Va.
Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 667, 670 (1966); Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 56162,
581 (1964).
23 See, e.g., Burdickv. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, 433 (1992);Andersonv. Celebrezze, 460
U.S. 780, 78688 (1983); William v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 3031 (1968).
24 See Burdick, 504 U.S. at428;Lassiterv. NorthamptonCnty. Bd. ofElections, 360 U.S.
45 (1959); Crawford v. Marion Cnty. Elections Bd., 553 U.S. 181, 18990 (2008). Richard
Briffaults paper offers a helpful survey of the ways in which the Courts doctrine has become
lessprotectiveoftherighttovoteratherthanmoreduringthelastfew decades. Briffault,
supra note 7, at 3031.
25 Supportersofamendmentroutinelyinvoketheseproblemswhenmakingthecasefor
arighttovote. See, e.g., ADVANCEMENT PROJECT, supra note 11, at 36, 11; Field, supra note
13, at 34; Jamin B. Raskin, A Right-to-VoteAmendment for theU.S.Constitution:Confronting
Americas Structural Democracy Deficit, 3ELECTIONL.J.559,560,56263 (2004) [hereinafter
Raskin, A Right-to-Vote Amendment];Raskin, Whats Wrong with Bushv. Gore, supra note
16, at695.
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Courtcannotrealisticallysubjecteveryadministrativedecisionburdeningthefran-
chisetostrictscrutiny. Someadministrativerulesareclearlybeingmanipulatedto
makeitharderforonegrouporanothertovote.26 Butalmostevery administrativede-
cisionendsuphelpingsomevotersandharmingothers, ifonlybecauseeveryadmin-
istrativedecisionallocatesscarceresourcestooneplaceandawayfrom another.27
Giventhisstubbornbureaucraticfact, theCourtwillbeforcedtodowhatitdoesin
any other administrative contextbalance the interests of the state against the interests
ofvoters.28 In such a context, its unrealistic to think that the Court wil apply a robust
form ofstrictscrutiny. WhentheCourtappliesstrictscrutinyintheracecontext, it
does so because it is highly skeptical of the states motives. In the context of election
administration, however, there will almost always be serious interests on the states
side, eveniftheyaremerelyconventionalbureaucraticinterests. AstheCourtnoted
inBurdick v. Takushi:
[T]osubjecteveryvotingregulationtostrictscrutinyandtorequire
thattheregulationbenarrowlytailoredtoadvanceacompelling
stateinterest. . . wouldtiethehandsofStatesseekingtoassure
thatelectionsareoperatedequitablyandefficiently. Accordingly,
the mere fact that a States system creates barriers . . . tending to
limitthefieldofcandidatesfrom whichvotersmightchoose. . .
does not of itself compel close scrutiny.29
Balancing, then, wil be the courts modus operandi after amendment, just as it is now.
Thats not to say that you cant eke out wins from the courts. To the contrary, the
recentspateofjudicialrulingsinvalidatingvoterID schemesconfirmsthis. Butnote
that those wins didnt come from the sudden introduction of a robust right to vote into
ourConstitutionorevenanimportantchangeinthelaw. Asbestwecantell, those
victorieswerewonbysmartlitigatingandsmartpoliticking. Insidethecourtroom,
26 Oneneednotlookpastpartisangerrymanderingforproof, butex-
amplesaboundinelectionadministrationaswel. Perhapsthemostegre-
gious example occurred when Ohios thenSecretary of State, Kenneth
Blackwell, insistedthatvoterregistrationapplicationsbeprintedon80-
poundcardstock(thetypeofpaperusedforweddinginvitations). There
couldbenootherjustificationforthisrulesavepartisanmanipulation.
GERKEN, DEMOCRACY INDEX, supra note12, at17.
27 RichardBriffaultraisesanotherchallengingwrinkle: therolestateandlocaladminis-
tratorsplayinrunningelections, somethingthatraisesadditionalhurdlestovindicatingarobust
righttovote. Briffault, supra note 7, at 3637.
28 While the Justices often debate precisely how to strike that balanceas is made clear
from themajority, concurring, anddissentingopinionsinCrawford v. Marion County Election
Board, 553 U.S. 181 (2008)no one seriously disputes the necessity of a balancing test in
thiscontext.
29 Burdick, 504 U.S. at 43334 (quoting Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134, 143 (1972))
(citationsomitted).
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advocatesofferedmoreandbetterevidencethanwasofferedinCrawford. Outsidethe
courtroom, advocatesworkedtoreframevoterID asapartisanfightratherthanafight
over fraud, thereby pushing judges to evaluate the states proffered interests with more
skepticism. Whatmovedjudges, then, wasbeterevidenceandbeterpublicrelations,
notbetertextorbeterprecedent. Bothcanbeatainedwithtargetedcampaignsrather
thanagiantgrassrootsmovementtoenshrinetherighttovoteintheConstitution.
Moreover, to the extent that much disenfranchisement stems from benign neglect
a lack of professionalism, a lack of resourcesrather than nefarious discrimination,30
evenrobustjudicialreview isunlikelytobeofmuchhelp. Judgesarenotwellsuited
to deal with large-scale institutional problems of this sort, as they cant put election
systemsintoreceivership. Thesearebureaucraticproblems, andtheyrequirebureau-
craticsolutions. Weoftenthinkthatvotingreform comesfrom outsideoftheelection
systemfrom rules imposed by legislators oroversightimposedbyreformers. Butthe
mostimportantleversofchangeareoftenelectionadministratorsthemselves. Ifelec-
tionadministratorshaveastrongsetofprofessionalnorms, agreed-uponbestpractices,
andthetechnicalcapacityandresourcestoanticipateandfixproblemsinadvance,
therewillbealotlessforlegislatorsandreform groupstodo. Ifyouwanttospend
your resources on reform, its beter to focus on improving the state of election admin-
istrationthanonignitingalarge-scalesocialmovement.
Reformersbelievethatanamendmentwillnotonlymitigateburdensontheex-
erciseofthefranchise, butalsoliftrestrictionsonwhomayexercisethefranchisein
thefirstplace.31 A robustrighttovote, wearetold, willensurethatmanypeoplewho
cannotcastaballotforacongressionalrepresentativetodaywillbeabletodosoin
thefuture, includingfelons,32 noncitizens,33 residentsofPuertoRicoandotherU.S.
territories,34 andmost relevant to this symposiumresidents of D.C.35
As to the last two groups, a generic right to vote isnt going to help.36 Thereason
that residents of D.C., Guam, Puerto Rico, et al. cant vote has to do with something
already in the Constitutions text: the word state.37 Rightlyorwrongly, mostreadthe
30 See generally GERKEN, DEMOCRACY INDEX, supra note12.
31 See ADVANCEMENT PROJECT, supra note11, at11.
32 See id. at 14 (The goal of any movement should push further by expanding the fran-
chise to persons who are incarcerated or serving sentences . . . .); Raskin, A Right-to-Vote
Amendment, supra note25, at564;Raskin, Whats Wrong with Bushv. Gore, supra note16,
at695.
33 See ADVANCEMENT PROJECT, supra note 11, at 1213.
34 See id. at17;Raskin, A Right-to-Vote Amendment, supra note 25, at 56566; Raskin,
Whats Wrong with Bushv. Gore, supra note16, at695.
35 See ADVANCEMENTPROJECT, supra note 11, at 1617; Raskin, Whats Wrong with Bush
v. Gore, supra note16, at695.
36 Reformers, muchtotheircredit, explicitlyacknowledgethisfactandnotethateither
a maximalist amendment, to use the Advancement Projects term, or a second amendment
wouldbenecessarytoachievethisgoal. ADVANCEMENT PROJECT, supra note 11, at 14, 1617.
37 Foradiscussionofthisconstitutionalquestion, seeRaskin, Democratic Capital, supra
note 17, at 5152.
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texttoprecludeU.S. citizensresidinginD.C. ortheterritoriesfrom votingformem-
bers of Congress. A generic amendment wouldnt fix that problem.
Norisitclearthatthesetwogroupsarewellservedbytyingtheirfatestoa
genericright-to-votecampaigninthehopeofpassingtwoamendmentsratherthan
one. Muchdependsonwhetheryouthink, likemostpoliticalscientists, thatdiscrete
andconcentratedinterestsdobeterinpoliticsthanbroad, diffuseinterests.38 More-
over, itisnotclearthatastirringcampaignontherighttovoteisgoingtolendgreater
moralweighttotheclaimsofU.S. citizensintheterritoriesorD.C. TaketheDC Vote
movementforexample.39 TheclaimsofD.C. votersalready haveagreatdealofmoral
weight;theyareUnitedStatescitizensdeprivedofrepresentationsimplybecausethey
live in the nations capital. Whats stopping D.C. residents from voting at this point
isapoliticalcalculus, notamoralone.40
As to other groupsfelons and noncitizensits just as hard to imagine a generic
amendment changing the Courts view on whether these groups may be properly ex-
cludedfrom voting.41 Thereareseriousargumentsforgreaterinclusion. Butuntilthe
Courtchangesitsviewsonex-felonsandnoncitizens, thesecategorieswilbeintuitive
enoughfortheJusticestothinkthatstatesshouldhavediscretiontoexcludethese
twogroupsfrom thebalot. Judgesalreadybelievethattherighttovoteisimportant.
If you want judges to invalidate restrictions on ex-felons voting, you need to change
theirmindaboutex-felons. Ifyouwantjudgestoinvalidaterestrictionsonnoncitizen
voting, youneedtochangetheirmindsaboutnoncitizens. Hereagain, acampaign
laudingagenericrighttovoteseemslikeanindirectmethodforaddressingthereal
source of judges hesitation to do what reformers want them to do.
Finally, somethinkthatarighttovotewillpushthecourtstoendpartisangerry-
mandering.42 Here again, the solution is pretty indirect. The source of the Courts hesi-
tation to regulate partisan gerrymanders isnt the absence of a textual guarantee; its
theabsenceofamanageablestandard. EveninthedayswhentheCourtbelievedit
38 Foranimportantassessmentofthisworkanditsrelationshiptoconstitutionaltheory,
seeBruceAckerman, Beyond CaroleneProducts, 98 HARV. L. REV. 713 (1985).
39 About DC Vote, DCVOTE, https://www.dcvote.org/about-dc-vote(lastvisitedOct. 23,
2014) (describing the movements efforts to secure voting representation in Congress for U.S.
citizensintheDistrictofColumbia).
40 Manybelieve, probablycorrectly, thatD.C. islikelytoelecttwoDemocratstotheSenate
and one to the Housesomething that might well affect the balance of power between the
parties. A desiretomaintainbalanceofpoliticalpowerislargelywhy, asJaminRaskinnotesin
his contribution to this symposium, Most states have entered the Union as part of a bipartisan
and sectional deal, roughly in pairs, like animals boarding Noahs ark. Raskin, Democratic
Capital, supra note17, at49.
41 RichardBriffaultisofthesameview. See Briffault, supra note 7, at 4243.
42 See Field, supra note 13, at 5 (stating that a constitutionally guaranteed right to vote
would put an end to gerrymandering of legislative and congressional districts). Jamie Raskin
alsosuggeststhattheamendmentandthemovementbehinditwillmitigatediscrimination
againstthirdpartiesandindependents. Raskin, A Right-to-Vote Amendment, supra note25,
at 57072; Raskin, Whats Wrong with Bushv. Gore, supra note16, at695.
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wasconstitutionallyauthorizedtoregulatepartisangerrymanders, itgaveusnothing
butawatered-down, majoritarianstandardthatwasallbutimpossibletosatisfyin
practice.43 TheCourthasbeenreluctanttogofurther, however, forprudentialreasons.
AsJusticeKennedyexplainedinhisremarkablyforthrightconcurrenceinVieth v.
Jubelirer,44 [b]ecause there are yet no agreed upon substantive principles of fairness
indistricting, wehavenobasisonwhichtodefineclear, manageable, andpolitically
neutral standards for adjudicating such claims.45
As Ive written elsewhere,46 the Court cant adjudicate partisan gerrymandering
claimsunlessitdoeswhatithasalwaysbeenloathetodo, atleastexplicitly: choose
a theory of democracy. Thats because any assessment of fairness in redistricting re-
quires a yardstickan account of how much power ought to be accorded to members
of a group in a democracy. Here again, a generic right-to-vote campaign wont provide
theCourtwiththatneededyardstick.
***
Anamendment, then, seemsunlikelytoproducethecuresfortheproblemsthat
reformers have identified. In each of the areas described above, the Courts reluc-
tancetoproviderobustprotectionsfortherighttovotehavestemmednotfrom the
absenceofatextualcommitment, butfrom theconcernsthatwillplaguethecourts
evenafteranamendmentisinplace. Judgesworryaboutimposingtheirownconcep-
tionofdemocracyonourdemocracy. Theyworryaboutleavingthestateadequate
discretiontocarryoutitsdutiesinadministeringelections. Theyhavestronglyheld
intuitionsaboutwhoshouldbeincludedinourpoliticalcommunity. Writingsomething
new intotheConstitutionwillnoterasethoseprudentialconsiderationsoreliminate
thosehumanintuitions. Thedanger, then, asRichardBriffaultpointedoutatthesym-
posium, wasthatlitigationinthewakeofamendmentwilsimplyreproducethesame
problemsthathavealwaysinheredinthesecases.47
Thisisnottosaythateverythingwillremainthesame. I presumethattheCourt
wil be a litle more skeptical of states asserted interests, wil scrutinize exclusionary
categoriesalitlemoreclosely, andwilbealitlebolderinthinkingthroughpartisan
gerrymandering. Thequestion, though, iswhetherthesechangeswilbeenoughtojus-
tifythesubstantialamountoftimeandeffortneededtoamendtheConstitution, or
whether, ashasalreadybeendonewithvoterID, itisbetertoworkonchangingper-
ceptionsissue-by-issue, category-by-category. I wouldnotdescribetheamendment
43 See, e.g., Davisv. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109, 124 (1986).
44 541 U.S. 267 (2003).
45 Id. at 30708 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
46 HeatherK. Gerken, Lost in the Political Thicket:The Court, Election Law, and the
Doctrinal Interregnum, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 503 (2004).
47 RichardBriffault, ProfessorofLawatColumbiaLawSchool, RemarksattheWilliam
& MaryBilofRightsJournalSymposium: Privacy, Democracy, & Elections(Oct. 22, 2010).
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processasablunderbusstokillaflea. Thegamethatreformersarestalkingisbig
game. Buttherighttovotemaynotbetherightweaponforthefightsreformerswant
tohave.
2. GoodiesthatComefrom Congress
ThecourtsarenottheonlysourceofsolaceforreformersiftheConstitutionis
amended, ofcourse. AsI noteabove, anamendmentwouldalmostcertainlygrantthe
Congressthepowertoenforcetheright, andsomethinkthatsuchaprovisionwilldo
muchtoimproveourdemocracy.48
Hereagain, I havemydoubts. EvensetingasideCity of Boerne v. Flores,49 which
has placed important limits on Congresss enforcement powers,50 thereislitleevi-
dence that Congresss passivity in this arena stems from a concern about a lack of con-
stitutionalauthority. Attheveryleast, Congressenjoyssubstantialauthoritytoregulate
federal elections,51 whichmeansthatCongressenjoysdefactoauthoritytoregulate
state elections, since states cant afford to run paralel processes. Moreover, states are
absolutelystarvedforfundstoruntheirelections, somethingthatgivesCongresssub-
stantialleverageundertheSpendingClause.52 Despite this fact, weve seen precious
littlefrom Congressoutsidethecivil-rightsarena. EvenBush v. Gorea fiasco of
suficientmagnitudethatitpromptedFidelCastrotooffertosendelectionmonitors
toFlorida53only prodded Congress to pass the toothless Help America Vote Act.54
Congresss failure to regulate thus far stems from a lack of political will, not consti-
tutionalpower. Andhereagain, itseemslikelythattargetedmobilizationeffortswill
achievemorereform thanadiffusecampaigntopushforagenericrighttovote.
II. WHAT IF . . .
Toevaluatethebestcaseforamendment, however, wehavetoacknowledgethat
the courts and Congresss failure to regulate occurs in this politicalenvironment. Per-
hapstheamendmentprocessitselfwouldfundamentallyaltertheregulatoryterrain,
48 See, e.g., Raskin, A Right-to-Vote Amendment, supra note 25, at 56364.
49 521 U.S. 507 (1996).
50 Id. at536. InthewakeofBoerne, CongresscanonlyenforcearightthattheCourtis
willingtorecognize. Whileitcan, tobesure, engageinremedialorprophylacticregulation,
enforcementpowerswillmatterlessinthefuturethantheyhaveinthepast.
51 PamelaS. Karlan& DanielR. Ortiz, Congressional Authority to Regulate Elections, in
NATL COMMN ON ELECTION REFORM, TO ASSURE PRIDE AND CONFIDENCE IN THE ELEC-
TORAL PROCESS 235, 235 (2002).
52 U.S. CONST. art. I, §8, cl. 1.
53 RichardLacayo, In the Eye of the Storm, TIME (Nov. 20, 2000), http://content.time
.com/time/world/article/0,8599,2047379,00.html.
54 HelpAmericaVoteAct, Pub. L. No. 107-252, 116 Stat. 1673 (2002) (codifiedas
amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1530115485 (2002)).
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either by changing how we, as a society, think about the right to votesomething
that should affect both the courts and Congressor by giving courts beter tools with
whichtodecideelectioncases.
Astothefirst, arobustsocialmovementinfavorofamendmentwouldobviously
matter.55 Indeed, it might matter even if the movement doesnt ultimately succeed
in amending the text of the Constitution. Reva Siegels important work on the Equal
RightsAmendmentsuggeststhateventhoughtheamendmentitselffailed, themove-
mentbehinditsucceededinchangingthemindsoftheAmericanpeople, including
Americanjudges.56 Asaresult, judgeswerewilingtomoveafairwaytowardgender
equalitythroughcase-by-casedecisionsevenwithoutthebenefitofanamendment.
Think, too, aboutthesocialmovementforgayrightsandsame-sexmarriagetoday.
The Constitutions text hasnt changed, but the law has.
My worry is that a right-to-vote movement isnt the kind of movement likely to
induceaseaofchangeinAmericanpolitics. Thepoliticsof(mis)recognitionfueled
thesocialmovementsdescribedabove. Ineachinstance, agroupdemandedequality,
andthelaw eventuallybegantocedeittothem. Therighttovotecertainlyresonates
for such movements, as Judith Shklars evocative work makes clear.57 Peoplefought
anddiedfortheVotingRightsAct, andwithgoodreason. Butthatmovementwaspart
ofalargermovementforequality, notjustamovementfortherighttovote.
ThetroublewithapushforarighttovotetodayisthatmostAmericansalready
possessit. Inthe1960s, denyingthevotetoAfrican-Americanswaspartandparcel
of denying their standing in American society. Some forms of disenfranchisement
notably, restrictions on voting by ex-felons and noncitizenstake a similar form in
the eyes of many. But reformers patchwork of grievances58 includesmanyharms
that are more diffuse and less personal. You may think its outrageous that legislators
draw theirowndistrictsorthatburdensomeregistrationrequirementsmakeitharder
for many to vote or that someone asks for your ID at the polls, but its often hard to
claim thatthoseregulationsareaimedatreducingyourstandinginsociety. Andwhen
suchaclaim can bemade, weseepeopleenergizedandreadytofightthegoodfight.
Moreover, formostAmericans, theproblemswithourelectionsystem seem one
stepremovedfrom theireverydayconcerns, liketheeconomyorhealthcareortheedu-
cation of their kids. And while I believe fervently that process shapes substancethat
55 Thats why Jamie Raskin, one of the right-to-vote amendments most ardent and able
defenders, is careful to base his claims on both the amendment and the movement behind it.
Raskin, Whats Wrong with Bushv. Gore, supra note16, at695;see also Raskin, Democratic
Capital, supra note 17, at 5961. For a description of what such a movement might look like,
seeADVANCEMENT PROJECT, supra note 11, at 1820.
56 RevaSiegel, Constitutional Culture, Social Movement Conflict and Constitutional
Change:The Case of the de facto ERA, 94 CALIF. L. REV. 1323, 132324 (2006).
57 See generally JUDITH N. SHKLAR, AMERICAN CITIZENSHIP: THE QUEST FOR INCLUSION
(1991).
58 I borrowtheterm from JamieRaskin. Raskin, Whats Wrong with Bushv. Gore, supra
note16, at695.
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our political structures shape policy outcomesIm well aware of how hard it is to
make that point to people who arent immersed in this area. Second-order reform is
simplyharderthanfirst-orderreform.
Again, noneofthisismeanttosuggestthatagrass-rootsmovementisdoomed
tofail. Butattheveryleast, itwillencounterthesameorganizationalchallengesthat
reformersinotherareasencounterwhentheywanttofixharmsthatseem abstractor
fall diffusely on the American people. Ask environmental reformers how tough its
beentogetclimatechangelegislationthroughCongress. Askhuman-rightsadvocates
how hard its been to push the United States to join international treaties.
Moreover, eveniftherewereenoughgrassrootsenergybehindagenericright
tovotetogetanamendmentpassed, I wonderwhetherthatenergywillextendtothe
full patchwork of grievances that animate reformers efforts on this front. I noted
abovethatifyouwantjudgestostrikedownrestrictionsonvotingbyex-felonsor
noncitizens, youhavetochangetheirmindsaboutex-felonsandnoncitizens, not
abouttherighttovote. ThesamemaybetrueofeverydayAmericans. Believingmore
strongly in the importance of the vote wont necessarily translate into a push to ex-
tend the right to other groups. Its quite possible that more targeted campaigns might
betterservethesegroups. So, too, itmaybethattheseissueswillgetresolvednot
whentheyarefoldedintoabroaderdiscussionabouttherighttovote, butwhenthey
arefoldedintoabroaderdiscussionaboutcriminaljusticeorimmigration. Ineither
case, in a world with limited resources, its not clear that people who care about these
issueswouldbewisetospendtheirpoliticalcapitalonamendingtheConstitution.
I canthinkofoneotherreasontoenshrinetherighttovoteintheConstitution, but
thishasmoretodowiththehealthofthecourtsthanwiththehealthofourdemocracy.
While Im skeptical that an amendment would result in the many goodies that reform-
ers have promised, I do think an amendment would do somethingit would help the
courtsdoabeterjobofdoingwhattheyaredoingnow.59 For better or for worseand
probably for worsethe courts have become the de facto referees of election disputes.
Its the Star Wars problem. Like Obi-Wan Kenobi, they are our only hopethe only
ones, outsideofself-interestedpoliticians, whocanstepin. Butwhilecourtsinevitably
mustresolvethesecases, theylackthetoolstodoso. Justtakealookatoneofthe
Courts most revered lines of casesthe one person, one vote doctrine. The early
casesarelargelyunmooredfrom conventionallegalanalysis. I sometimesjokewith
mystudentsthattheonlylaw inthesecasesisinthedissents.
Thats not surprising given the contents of judges doctrinal toolboxes. In de-
cidingconstitutionalcases, judgestypicallylooktothetext, history, doctrine, and
the structure of the Constitution to guide their decisions. Those tools arent generally
59 JamieRaskindoesnotdevelopthepointinthisfashion, butheatleastinsiststhata
textualcommitmentwouldhaveprevented, oratleastmitigated, whatheconsiderstobethe
fiascoofBush v. Gore. Raskin, Whats Wrong with Bushv. Gore, supra note16, at679
([T]he constitutional language [on which the Court relied was] so pliable that the Bush
majority could arrive at the astonishing resolution [that it did.]).
24 WILLIAM & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL [Vol. 23:11
available to judges in elections cases. We dont have much in terms of constitutional
textsaveaseriesofthou shalt not amendmentsthe Constitution does not even men-
tionpoliticalparties, theenginesofanydemocraticsystem. Ourhistory, needlessto
say, is sullied by a pattern of exclusion. Theres not a lot of doctrine yet developed.
Andconstitutionalstructureisalsooflittlehelp;itdoesnoteventelluswhoissup-
posedtodecidecertainbasicquestionsaboutourdemocracy, letalonehowtheyshould
decide them. Its hard to adhere to the dictates of legal craft when the basic tools of the
tradeareunavailable. Littlewonder, then, thatinreadingthesecases, onesometimes
hasthefeelingthatthejudgesarewingingit.
If theres a time when it is important for courts to pay atention to craft, its when
they intervene in politics. The courts cant avoid making decisions that will change
politicaloutcomes. Whentheydoso, however, theiropinionsshouldmeasureupto
thehigheststandards. Bush v. Gore isjustthemostprominentexampleofwhathap-
penswhenjudgesofferabadlyreasoneddecisionthatalignswiththeirownpolitical
preferences. But smaller examples abound. Elections caseseven cases within the
same doctrinal lineare rife with contradictions and poor reasoning.60
What the courts realy need is what David Strauss briliantly describes as common
law constitutionalism.61 Inmanyotherareasofconstitutionallaw, courtshavebegun
with a vague constitutional guaranteethe right to free speech, equal protection
and gradually built up a long line of precedent. It doesnt constrain judges entirely,
farfrom it. Butitdoesgivetheirdecisionsshapeandform. Overtime, judicialwisdom
islayeredontoathinconstitutionaltext. A well-developedcaselaw, inshort, helps
ensurethatjudgesadheretothedictatesofcraft.
For the doctrine to develop, though, we need a starting point, and we dont have
one. WithoutarighttovoteenshrinedintheConstitution, thecourtsinevitablylook
totheFirstandFourteenthAmendments. Buttheseamendmentscaptureonlyapart
of what maters in voting. As Ive writen elsewhere, [t]oo often courts witlessly apply
the case law without thinking about what makes elections distinctive.62 Asaresult,
the case law is a messunruly, incoherent, and often ad hoc. Adding a right to vote
to the Constitution wouldnt guarantee beter elections, but it might wel get us better
electionsdecisions. Whetherornotthisvalueisenoughtojustifyalltheorganizing
andpolitickingnecessarytoamendtheConstitution, attheveryleastthereisagood
chanceofapayoff.
60 Foronesetofexamples, seeHeatherK. Gerken, The Costs and Causes of Minimalism
in VotingCases:Bakerv. Carrand Its Progeny, 80 N.C. L. REV. 1411, 143436 (2002).
61 DavidA. Strauss, Common LawConstitutional Interpretation, 63 U.CHI.L.REV. 877,
88491 (1996). Strauss, of course, doesnt thinkcommonlawconstitutionalism dependson
a text. Im not insisting here that a text is necessary. My point is simply that an amendment
even a vaguely defined, under-specified amendmentwould help jumpstart the process for
creatingthecommonlawconstitutionalism thattheCourtrequirestoadjudicateelectionlaw
casesproperly.
62 HeatherGerken, The MissingRight to Vote, SLATE (June13, 2012, 10:48 PM), http://
hive.slate.com/hive/how-can-we-fix-constitution/article/the-missing-right-to-vote.
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CONCLUSION
ThisEssaytakesthepositionthatonecanfavoraright-to-voteamendmentwith-
outfavoringamendingtheConstitutiontoaddarighttovote. Itwouldbewonderful
iftheConstitutionincludedarobustrighttovote. Butgivenhow few resourceswe
havetofightthegoodfight, I wouldratherseethem directedtowarddiscreteprojects
withconcretepayoffs. Thecostsoftheamendmentprocessarehigh, andmostofthe
promised benefits seem unlikely to accrue. Even when we look beyond the reformers
wish lists, its stil hard to come up with a good reason to invest the resources necessary
toenshrinetherighttovoteintheConstitution. Targetedlitigatingandpolitickingseem
morelikelytobringaboutthedesiredresultsthanafull-fledgedsocialmovement. The
amendmentprocessmightproducearobustshiftinhow weview therighttovote,
and an amendment might produce a welcome improvement in the Courts doctrine.
Thefirstinvolvesabigpayoffbutsteepodds;thesecondinvolvesasmallpayoff
butreasonableodds. Ifyouwereinfrontofthepoliticalroulettewheel, isthatwhere
youd place your bet?
